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Approaching the Extraterritoriality Debate
I. Introduction
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all in-
dividuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind .... "1
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was created after
World War II and was one of the first efforts undertaken by the newly formed United Na-
tions. 2 According to President Truman, the ICCPR was to be " 'an international bill of rights
acceptable to all the nations involved... . [It] will be as much part of international life as
our own Bill of Rights is part of our own Constitution.' "3 After the ICCPR entered into
force,4 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) was established to carry out its functions and
to monitor its implementation.s In fulfilling its responsibilities, the HRC has had to interp-
ret various provisions of the ICCPR-a task that can often create tensions with member
states. This is particularly true with the HRC's interpretation of Article 2(1), which deals
with the geographic application of the treaty.6
The debate that has emerged over the language in Article 2(1) shows the impact that
eight simple words can have in the arena of international human rights. The United States,
along with other state parties, argue that the plain meaning of the language shows that the
ICCPR only applies within a state's territory.7 However, the HRC, supported to some extent
by an opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), argues that the language requires
states to apply the ICCPR extraterritorially as this would be more coherent with the pur-
pose and provisions of the Covenant.8 This current debate presents the question of wheth-
er the HRC has over-interpreted the treaty and undermined its authority or whether it has
taken a persuasive position establishing a new customary norm whereby states recognize
and apply the rights and responsibilities enumerated in the ICCPR outside of their borders.
While it has taken a strong position on the ICCPR's scope, the HRC will face difficulties in
getting state parties to abide by its interpretation without support from major powers like
the U.S. Yet in spite of the public disagreement between the U.S. and HRC over Article 2(1),
it appears that the HRC's position may be having an incremental effect; the U.S., while still
staunchly endorsing its own view, has provided limited reporting on its extraterritorial ac-
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. Egon Schwelb, Entry into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 511 (1976).
3. Id.
4. See ICCPR, supra note 1. The United States signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1977 and ratified it on lune
8, 1992. Id
5. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 28(1). See also DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 6, 44 (1991) (not-
ing that the HRC was approved only by a narrow vote during the drafting of the ICCPR).
6. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
7. U.S. Dep't of State, Second and Third Periodic Report of the United States of America to the UN Commit-
tee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 129, deli-
vered to the Human Rights Committee, Oct 21, 2005 [hereinafter Second and Third Periodic Reports].
8. Hugh King, The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States, 9 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 521, 522-24
(2009).
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tivities as a courtesy to the HRC. Although this alone is insufficient to establish a rule of
customary international law, it might be considered as evidence of state practice and opi-
nio juris. This suggests that the HRC's position has persuasive appeal and, while the HRC
faces challenges in its efforts to promote its interpretation, if it chooses to constructively
engage state parties it may be able to achieve a favorable consensus in the future. On the
other hand, if the HRC takes an antagonistic approach toward state parties, it could un-
dermine the very support that it needs to ensure compliance with the ICCPR. Furthermore,
by continuing an antagonistic approach with the U.S., the HRC is merely presenting oppor-
tunities for the U.S. to establish a persistent objector position.
This paper will begin with an analysis of the constraints that treaty bodies like the HRC
face as they seek to enforce and interpret treaty language. It will then look at the formation
of the ICCPR and its substantive provisions followed by an overview of U.S. ratification of
the treaty and the various reservations, understandings and declarations that it made at
the time. It will then delve into the Article 2(1) debate and examine how different interpre-
tations of its language play out on the international stage. The paper will conclude by not-
ing how the use of sound legal arguments and a policy of constructive engagement would
be more beneficial for the HRC and may generate greater cooperation from state parties
that oppose the HRC's interpretation, such as the U.S.
II. Treaty Bodies and Treaty Interpretation
Like other legal texts, treaties are often the subject of interpretive debate among parties
and the bodies created to implement their provisions. For the ICCPR, the task of imple-
menting the agreement resides with the HRC. According to the Covenant, such implemen-
tation occurs primarily through regular state reports9 submitted to the HRC, which also has
the authority to issue "such general comments as it may consider appropriate" to the par-
ties.10 In carrying out such tasks, the HRC has also felt compelled to interpret various pro-
visions of the ICCPR and has taken an active role in that regard."
Under the Covenant, for example, the HRC has the authority to review and comment on
periodic reports required of state parties,12 but the treaty does not specify how frequently
such reports must be submitted.13 Using its interpretive authority, the HRC determined
that five years was a sufficient period for the regular reports, but it further determined that
Article 40(1)(b) granted it the authority to request supplemental reports from states in re-
9. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 40.
10. Id. art. 40(4).
11. See Ineke Boerefijn, Towards a Strong System of Supervision: The Human Rights Committee's Role in
Reforming the Reporting Procedure under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17
HUM. RTS. Q. 775,788-91 (1995).
12. ICCPR, supra note 1, art 40. See also McGOLDRICK, supra note 5, at 50. The HRC also has the authority
to receive and consider inter-state complaints if both parties consent to the HRC's authority, although
this system has not yet been used. Dan E. Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion ofthe Uni-
form Code of MilitaryJustice ("UCMJ") Over Civilians and the Implications of International Human Rights
Law, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 59,97 (2009).
13. ICCPR, supra note 1, art 40(1)(b) (stating that state reports can be submitted "whenever the Commit-
tee so requests"). See also McGOLDRICK, supra note 5, at 67-68.
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sponse to particular events.14 The HRC has thus set the precedent not just for its authority
to interpret the ICCPR but also for doing so in a way that enhances its monitoring powers.
While the HRC's interpretations on the reporting and commenting provisions of the ICCPR
are more clearly implied in the text and thus less controversial, it is quite a different case
when it comes to interpretation of Article 2(1), which deals with the scope of where the
treaty applies.
While treaty bodies like the HRC often have interpretive authority, like states they are
bound by the general rules of treaty interpretation as outlined in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).' 5 The Vienna Convention lays out a systematic
approach toward interpreting treaties such as the ICCPR. According to Article 31, treaties
are to be interpreted "in good faith" according to the "ordinary meaning... given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' 6 Like statu-
tory interpretation in the United States, understanding an international treaty starts with
the plain meaning of the text which is then considered in light of the context of the treaty
itself.17
In determining the context of a treaty, the Vienna Convention provides for analysis of
the preamble and annexes and any agreements or instruments that all the parties to a trea-
ty may have made in connection with the treaty.18 Along with such context, the Vienna
Convention also allows for the use of related subsequent agreements or practices among
the parties and also relevant rules of international law, which could include customary in-
ternational law.' 9 After that point, the Vienna Convention permits use of supplemental
means to confirm the meaning of a treaty and this includes the "preparatory work" of the
treaty and the "circumstances of its conclusion." 20 Such supplemental means are also per-
mitted to determine what the meaning of a treaty is, if the ordinary meaning is "ambiguous
or obscure" or would lead to a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" result.21 Thus, in inter-
preting international treaties, international bodies like the HRC are bound by specific rules
of interpretation that require the plain meaning as the starting point of analysis and in-
quiry into context and treaty formation only if such plain meaning is ambiguous.
Along with the obligation to abide by the rules of international law outlined in the Vien-
na Convention, there are also other practical reasons why treaty bodies should follow the
accepted rules of treaty interpretation. For any treaty to have force, the body charged with
its implementation must have credibility, especially with those states that are parties to the
treaty. The effectiveness of any treaty, after all, depends on the cooperation of its parties,
14. See Boerefijn, supra note 11, at 775 (describing an assassination in El Salvador as an example of the
committee's discretion).
15. Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905,
921-22 (2009).
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), adopted May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (en-
tered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
17. Mechlem, supra note 15, at 911-12.
18. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(2).
19. Id. art. 31(3).
20. Id. art. 32.
21. Id.
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and where a treaty body fails to follow accepted rules of treaty interpretation in conflict
with its parties, it undermines the overall support required to implement the treaty. 22
The legal force of a treaty body's interpretations will often depend on the "persuasive-
ness and analytical rigor" of their legal argument.2 3 While human rights treaty bodies seek
to promote human rights and the mandate of their treaty, if they neglect the terms of the
treaty and their obligation to abide by the Vienna Convention, they ultimately minimize the
impact of their actions. 24 To prevent such an occurrence and to ensure that their positions
have influence with state parties, treaty bodies such as the HRC should ensure that their
arguments are strong and reasoned, based on sound methodologies and grounded in lead-
ing international authorities. 2s
One way that a treaty body conveys its legal arguments on treaty interpretation is
through general comments. While some contend that a treaty body's positions in their gen-
eral comments are authoritative, 26 most recognize that such comments are not binding on
state parties although they can carry significant legal weight.27 Furthermore, a persuasive
general comment can establish subsequent practices and has the potential to generate new
binding norms in customary international law 28 such that disregard of general comments
by state parties would constitute bad faith.29 Overall, while treaty bodies are bound by the
Vienna Convention's rules on treaty interpretation, it is also in their practical interest to
follow such rules as doing so enhances their credibility and the likelihood that state parties
will cooperate and promote their position.
III. Formation and Structure of the ICCPR
Prior to WWII the presence or absence of human rights in a country was largely a do-
mestic concern, within the sovereign realm of state governments. 3 0 However, after the hor-
rific war crimes of WWII and the rise of the United Nations there emerged a new interna-
22. Mechlem, supra note 15, at 924.
23. ld. at 922.
24. Id. at 931-34, 938, 945-46 (criticizing the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' use of
General Comments by noting that its credibility was weakened by comments imposing obligations on
non-parties and by comments which sought to expand the extraterritorial scope of the treaty but
which only resulted in greater confusion and uncertainty).
25. Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-Marginalizing En-
forcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211, 231 (1998).
26. Asbjorn Eide, The Right to Food: Report on the Third Expert Consultation on the Right to Food, [ 14,
Comm'n for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/148 (Mar. 30, 2001).
27. Mechlem, supra note 15, at 929-30; see also MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
EcoNoMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 91 (1995).
28. Mechlem, supra note 15, at 930.
29. Caroline Dommen, Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered by the United Nations'
Human Rights Mechanisms, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 1, 21 (1998).
30. See George A. Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agreement When the Security Coun-
cil Fails to Act, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 311, 321-22 (2009) (noting that the classical view of sovereignty held
that it "trumps all else" as it resided in the state rather than the individual); see also ROBERT JACKSON,
THE GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES 308 (2000) (stating that the traditional
concept of sovereignty was "no guarantee of domestic well-being ... [it was] merely the framework of
independence within which the good life can be pursued and hopefully realized").
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tional consensus.31 What emerged were stronger efforts to promote individual human
rights and their enforcement as reflected in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention Against Genocide and the ICCPR.32 The UN Charter, while
stating as one of its purposes the promotion of human rights,3 3 did not fully specify such
rights and, because of this, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR)
was adopted by the General Assembly.34 While the UDHR was an important step in enume-
rating human rights on an international stage, like the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the UDHR was not intended to be a legally binding instrument but rather a "com-
mon standard of achievement."35
Out of these early and bold efforts to promote a new international norm respecting indi-
vidual human rights emerged the ICCPR, which has been referred to as the "hard law" ver-
sion of the UDHR. 36 While the ICCPR includes and expands upon many of the rights laid out
in the UDHR,37 its most significant and historic feature is that it was one of the first legally
binding international human rights instruments.38 Furthermore, the fact that the ICCPR
was adopted and has been ratified by states from all corners of the world shows that it was
not limited to particular states and ideologies but rather represented burgeoning interna-
tional human rights norms accepted by nearly all cultures.3 9 The emergence of the ICCPR
on the world stage was thus the first time that a truly international agreement was created
that bound states to specific human rights obligations.
Referring to the "inherent dignity of the human person,"40 the ICCPR built upon the
foundational rights referenced in the UN Charter and the UDHR and included a list of wide
ranging rights to be recognized and enforced by state parties. According to its provisions,
parties agree to respect and ensure the rights to self-determination, 41 life, 42 privacy,43 due
31. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 101
(1977) (noting the evolution of state sovereignty since WWIl and how it can be overcome "when a
government turns savagely on its own people").
32. See Critchlow, supra note 30, at 341.
33. U.N. Charter art. 1, 3.
34. Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make
a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95, 96 (1999).
35. Christina M. Cerna, Reflections on the Normative Status of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1211, 1211-12 (2009).
36. Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN Human Rights Committee Doc-
uments, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 187, 187-18 (2000).
37. Keith, supra note 34, at 96.
38. McGOLDRICK, supra note 5, at 20-21. Some observers have even argued that the ICCPR is binding on
non-parties as they either point to the historical link between the UN Charter and the ICCPR or they
argue that the provisions of the ICCPR have become customary international law which binds all
states. Id.
39. See id. at 20-21; see also Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last accessed June 25, 2011) (currently there are 165 parties to the ICCPR
and 72 signatories).
40. ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl.
41. Id. art. 1.
42. Id. art. 6.
43. Id. art. 17.
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process, 44 thought and religion,45 and the right to be free from torture46 and arbitrary ar-
rest,4 7 among other guaranties. The ICCPR further states that all of the rights in the cove-
nant apply equally to men and women, 48 which was also a significant step in the trajectory
of human rights.
While most of the rights enumerated in the ICCPR are not the subject of much dispute,
some of its other provisions have caused reservations among state parties. For example, it
prohibits propaganda for war and also bans advocacy of hatred that incites not just vi-
olence but also hostility or discrimination. 49 Although such provisions seem to promote
important values of tolerance, they also have the potential to conflict with other values,
such as respect for freedom of speech, particularly in a country like the U.S., where such a
right is nearly sacrosanct.so So while the ICCPR enumerates several important rights as in-
herent for every individual, applying its template of rights domestically may be problemat-
ic, even in states with strong reputations for supporting human rights.
Because such rights are binding on state parties, the ICCPR also devised a system of en-
forcement to ensure that states abide by their obligations. This is done primarily through
two major functions of the HRC. The first is the reporting requirement whereby state par-
ties must submit periodic reports to the HRC along with any supplemental reports that it
requests.5' The second mechanism is the inter-state complaint system in which states can
police one another by submitting complaints to the HRC, although this system requires that
all parties involved first consent to the HRC's competence to consider the issue.5 A subse-
quent Optional Protocol also permits the HRC to hear complaints from individuals.s 3 How-
ever, not all state parties have agreed to it, and even under the protocol, the HRC is only al-
lowed to issue "views" on such complaints, not binding judgments.5 4
The HRC also has the authority to issue General Comments on provisions of the ICCPR,
however such comments are not binding on the state parties.5s In spite of this, the HRC's
general comments are considered persuasive authorities, but only so long as the HRC re-
tains its credibility as the authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR.56 Because of the credibili-
ty given to the HRC, its decisions and views have a "norm-creating property that can serve
44. Id. art. 14.
45. Id. art. 18.
46. Id. art. 7.
47. Id. art. 9.
48. Id. art. 3.
49. Id. art. 20.
50. See Joshua S. Geller, A Dangerous Mix: Mandatory Sentence Enhancements and the Use of Motive, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 641 (2005).
51. Harland, supra note 36, at 188.
52. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 41(1) ("A State Party... may at any time declare ... that it recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State party is not fulfilling its obligations.").
53. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.1, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20i/chapter%20iv/iv-5.en.pdf.
54. Harland, supra note 36, at 188.
55. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 40(4) ("The Committee . . . shall transmit its reports, and such general
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties."); see, e.g., Keith, supra note 34, at 98.
56. See Stigall, supra note 12, at 76.
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to create customary international law" which would be binding on states.5 7 Thus, the ICCPR
was set up with strong substantive provisions but with a somewhat weaker enforcement
mechanism as the HRC's primary means of enforcing the treaty rests in self-reporting by
state parties. However, there is the potential for stronger enforcement if the HRC uses its
interpretative authority to foster binding norms.
One further limitation on enforcement of the ICCPR is in the text of the covenant itself.
Under Article 4, state parties are permitted to derogate from their obligations in emergen-
cy situations where the "life of the nation" is in danger, but only to the extent that is "strict-
ly required by the exigencies of the situation."5 8 While the ICCPR allows for such excep-
tions, the derogation authority only applies to certain provisions as, even in emergency
situations, state parties still must protect against arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, sla-
very, or threats to freedom of thought and religion.59 One of the major problems with dero-
gation, however, is the definition of "public emergency" and the question of who has the
authority to determine when it exists.60 So while the provisions of the ICCPR lend strong
support for human rights, the covenant creates a hierarchy of such rights and permits
states to discharge some of their duties in times of emergency.
The ICCPR was originally established to build on the growing postwar consensus sup-
porting human rights by creating obligations on states to enforce them. In many ways, the
Covenant was the first time in history that an international human rights treaty created
binding obligations on so many states in the international system. While creating one of the
strongest human rights covenants in history, the ICCPR also established a relatively weak
system of enforcement. The HRC, while having the power to require reports from state par-
ties and issue general comments, ultimately lacked any power to significantly leverage
state parties to uphold their obligations, making implementation of the ICCPR highly de-
pendent on the cooperation of state parties and the authority of the HRC.
IV. U.S. Ratification of the ICCPR
The U.S. signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1977, over ten years after it was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly, and ratified it over fifteen years later on June 8, 1992.61 The delay
was due, in part, to fears that the ICCPR's obligations would diminish U.S. institutions and
sovereignty and threaten its federal system of government. 62 Because of such fears, the U.S.
placed certain qualifications on its ratification. As is common practice among states, the
57. Id. at 76, 98-99 (customary international law is not binding on "persistent objectors," which are
states that continuously and consistently object to norms that are in the process of becoming custo-
mary international law).
58. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
59. Id. art. 4(2).
60. McGOLDRICK, supra note 5, at 302-03. The HRC has not provided a clear definition of public emergen-
cy, only stating that not all wars or natural disasters constitute public emergencies as they may not
involve threats to the life of the nation. See also Julie Debeljak, Balancing Rights in a Democracy: The
Problems with Limitations and Overrides of Rights under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Re-
sponsibilities Act, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 422, 441 (2008).
61. Major Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of Human
Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 MIL. L. REv. 1, 2 (2007).
62. Id.
407
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 407 2011
9 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (2011)
U.S. attached specific reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs) to its ratifica-
tion to make certain that its ICCPR obligations would not conflict with existing domestic
law in the U.S. 63 The Human Rights Committee noted the RUDs attached to the U.S. ratifica-
tion by stating that it "regrets the extent of the ... reservations, declarations and under-
standings to the Covenant ... taken together, they intended to ensure that the United States
has accepted what is already the law of the United States."64
The U.S. was specifically concerned with the ICCPR's prohibition of hate speech,6 5 its de-
finition of torture,66 its restrictions on capital punishment,67 and its ban on charging juve-
niles as adults. 68 With these reservations, the U.S. relied on its own jurisprudence as its
guide, seeking to fit the ICCPR into existing domestic laws. For example, the U.S. agreed to
the ban on hate speech so long as this provision would not go beyond existing U.S. free
speech jurisprudence. 69 It also stated that it would define torture and "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment"70 within existing domestic definitions of torture
based on the Eighth Amendment.7 ' For capital punishment, the U.S. also reserved the right
to impose it on any person (including those under eighteen years of age), citing existing
constitutional protections for defendants and restrictions on its use.72 With respect to its
reservations, the U.S. followed a trend of fitting the ICCPR into its existing domestic laws
such that they would have no additional affect on the U.S. legal system.
The U.S. also issued several understandings when it ratified the ICCPR. Among them, it
noted that while the ICCPR prohibited various forms of discrimination7 3 in applying its
provisions, the U.S. would continue to follow its constitutional mandate of equal protection
and its different judicial standards to evaluate discriminatory laws.74 The U.S. government
also stated its understanding that the ICCPR would not upset its federal system of govern-
63. Id.
64. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, Spare the RUD or Spoil the Treaty: The United States Challenges the Human Rights
Committee on Reservations, in THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD
111 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000).
65. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
66. Id. art. 7.
67. Id. art. 6(2), (4)-(6) (requiring sentences of capital punishment to be rendered by competent courts
only for adults who commit serious crimes. ("Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to
prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State party to the present Covenant")).
68. Id. art. 10(2)(b), 14(4).
69. Id. at United States of America Reservations (1) available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last accessed Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Reservations and Declara-
tions].
70. Id. art. 7.
71. Id. at United States of America Reservations (3).
72. Id. at United States of America Reservations (5).
73. Id. art. 2(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or oth-
er opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status").
74. Id. at United States of America Understandings (1).
[T]he Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all persons equal protection of the law
.... The United States understands distinctions.., as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph 1
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ment by requiring the national government to go beyond its constitutionally authorized
powers.7s These understandings, along with others pertaining to criminal procedure, also
were part of an effort to ensure that the ICCPR would not conflict with current U.S. juri-
sprudence or upset the balance in its federal system. Like its reservations, the understand-
ings which the U.S. appended to its ratification also sought to conform the ICCPR to existing
domestic laws so that they would not create additional obligations (except for regular re-
porting) and thus would have no additional external affect on the U.S. legal system.
The final qualifications that the U.S. made in ratifying the ICCPR were its general decla-
rations on the ICCPR as a whole. One of the major declarations was that the U.S. did not
view the substantive rights in the ICCPR as self-executing, thus requiring congressional ac-
tion before it would take effect in the U.S.76 Furthermore, the U.S. is one of the only coun-
tries to declare that the substantive provisions of the ICCPR do not create private rights of
action for individuals.77 However, while this declaration seems to place a major limitation
on the ICCPR as the U.S. views it, the U.S. also declared that it would recognize the HRC's
competence to hear inter-state complaints, a declaration which it had the option to decline,
and which enhanced the authority of the HRC.78 So the U.S. position is that the ICCPR can-
not be enforced by individuals, but it can be enforced by other state parties.
The other major U.S. declaration dealt with the balance between the ICCPR and domes-
tic constitutional protections, as it noted that where the ICCPR provides fewer protections
for certain rights than domestic law, such states should abide by their domestic protec-
tions.79 The U.S. declarations thus drew clear lines around application of the ICCPR. While
it recognized that states could issue complaints against one another, it also prohibited in-
dividuals from doing so and reinforced the primacy of domestic law in protecting the subs-
tantive rights in the Covenant.
What is important to note, however, is the absence of any U.S. declaration as to whether
the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. Some might view this as evidence that the U.S. ac-
cepted this view when it ratified the treaty, but it could also mean that U.S. policymakers
assumed that the ICCPR would not apply extraterritorially due to the plain text of the trea-
ty, and efforts to apply it beyond a state's boundaries had not yet taken hold. A decade after
75. Id. at United States of America Declarations (1).
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Govern-
ment to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered
therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state and local gov-
ernments exercise jurisdiction over such matters ....
Id.
76. Id. at United States of America Declarations (3).
77. Harland, supra note 36, at 195.
78. Id. at United States of America Declarations (2).
79. Id.
Part[ies] to the Covenant should wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or limi-
tations on the exercise of the rights recognized and protected by the Covenant, even when such re-
strictions and limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant ... . [Fiundamental hu-
man rights existing in any State Party may not be diminished ... [because] the Covenant recognizes
them to a lesser extent ....
Id.
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U.S. ratification and the emergence of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), however, brought
this issue to the fore and the question of whether or not the treaty applied extraterritorial-
ly created a much more significant division between the U.S. and the HRC.
V. Article 2(1) and the Debate Over Extraterritoriality
The ICCPR granted authority to the HRC to interpret its provisions and provide guidance
to state parties. However, when the HRC interpreted the language of Article 2(1) as requir-
ing extraterritorial application, it was unsettling to some of the state parties8 o and raised
questions as to whether the HRC went too far in attempting to broaden the scope of the
treaty. The language in question states that parties to the ICCPR agree to ensure the rights
entrusted in it to all individuals "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."8 1 The
U.S. holds the position that this language limits the ICCPR to individuals who are both in
their jurisdiction and within their territory, rendering the treaty inapplicable outside of its
territory. 82 The HRC, however, determined that such language means that the ICCPR is
binding on state parties wherever they exercise "effective control," even if that happens to
be beyond their borders.83 This debate has taken on greater significance as the Global War
on Terror has seen the U.S. engaging itself in various countries to fight al-Qa'ida and other
transnational terrorist networks. Ultimately, while the Vienna Convention would dictate a
plain reading of the text that would seemingly favor the U.S. position, the HRC has pre-
sented sound arguments also based on the Vienna Convention's rules on treaty interpreta-
tion.
A. U.S. Position
In supporting its legal argument, the U.S. emphasizes plain language and treaty history,
in accordance with the Vienna Convention, which requires that any interpretation begin
with the ordinary meaning of the text.84 Perhaps the strongest argument for the U.S. posi-
tion is that the plain language itself connects the phrase "within its territory" and the
phrase "subject to its jurisdiction" with the conjunctive "and," implying that both condi-
tions must be met before the ICCPR applies.85
While recognizing the clarity of the language, the U.S. has also addressed the context of
the drafting and adoption of the treaty. When it submitted its second and third periodic re-
80. The Netherlands also took exception to the HRC's interpretation of Article 2(1) as it sought to resist
the HRC's request that it report on actions of Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica. Michael Dennis, Applica-
tion of Human Rights Treaties Extra territorially During Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupa-
tion, 100 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 86, 88 (2006).
81. ICCPR, supra note 1, art 2(1).
82. Matthew Waxman, Principal Deputy Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, Opening Statement to
the U.N. Human Rights Comm. (Jul. 17, 2006), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/70392.htm ("[l]t is the long-standing view of the United States that the Co-
venant by its very terms does not apply outside of the territory of a State Party.").
83. Centre for Civil and Political Rights [CCPR], General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13
(Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31].
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art 32.
85. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art 2(1).
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ports to the committee in 2006, the U.S. noted the role that the U.S. delegate, Eleanor Roo-
sevelt,86 played in drafting and proposing the language of Article 2(1).87 At the time the text
was being debated, the former first lady said that the U.S. was "particularly anxious" about
assuming obligations "to ensure the rights recognized in... [the ICCPR] to the citizens of
countries under United States occupation."8 She further described, "An illustration would
be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan: Persons within those countries
were subject to the jurisdiction of the occupying States in certain respects, but were out-
side the scope of legislation of those States. Another illustration would be leased territo-
ries."89 During the debate over the text of Article 2(1), then, it was clear that the drafters
were considering the question of extraterritoriality as Mrs. Roosevelt clearly articulated
the reasons for why the U.S. was proposing such language to limit the external application
of the covenant.
The recognition that the term "within its territory" qualified the broader scope of a
state's overall jurisdiction continued through the adoption phase of Article 2(1) and the
ICCPR itself. When the draft of the ICCPR was sent to the U.N. General Assembly, for exam-
ple, the Secretary-General included annotations to Article 2(1) which noted the limitations
of the proposed language and the resulting debate that took place:
There was some discussion on the desirability of retaining the words "within its territory" ... [as] it
was thought that a state should not be relieved of its obligations under the covenant to persons who
remained within its jurisdiction merely because it was not within its territory .... On the other hand
it was contended that it was not possible for a state to protect the rights of persons subject to its ju-
risdiction when they were outside of its territory .... 90
In describing the opposition to the proposed Article 2(1) language, the Secretary-
General also noted that objectors questioned whether limiting the ICCPR to the territorial
boundaries of a state would conflict with other provisions such as respecting the freedom
of any individual to return to his or her home country.91 The Secretary-General's notes ex-
plicitly show that during the drafting phase there was an active debate over extraterrito-
riality that centered on the language of Article 2(1).92 Those drafters who supported extra-
territorial application challenged the proposed language and, specifically, sought to
remove the phrase "within its territory" from the provision.9 3 The language that exists to-
day, then, was opposed by those drafters who wanted the ICCPR to apply externally.
Ultimately, the question over whether the plain meaning of the proposed Article 2(1)
language permitted extraterritorial exceptions dissipated when the draft of the ICCPR was
under consideration in the General Assembly. After the ICCPR was sent to the appropriate
General Assembly committee for consideration, representatives continued to contest the
86. Eleanor Roosevelt had an "immensely important influence" in the creation of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. McGOLDRICK, supra note 5, at 4.
87. See Waxman, supra note 82.
88. Dennis, supra note 80, at 89-90.
89. Id. at 90.
90. Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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intra-territorial language "within its territory" on the grounds that it could restrict other
rights in the Covenant, including the right of foreign nationals to have access to the courts
of their nationality.94 While in committee, representatives favoring extraterritorial applica-
tion suggested deleting the phrase "within its territory and," because of such fears that it
would ultimately limit the substantive guarantees of the ICCPR.95 China and France re-
quested a vote to remove that phrase, but it failed by a tally of fifty-five to ten and Article
2(1) was adopted as a whole by a vote of eighty-seven to zero.96
The drafters of the ICCPR, and the representatives that adopted it, understood that the
language of Article 2(1) would have the effect of limiting the ICCPR to a state party's terri-
tory, and seriously considered editing the language to allow the Covenant to be applied
extraterritorially. However, the context of the Covenant's construction quite clearly shows
that such changes were soundly rejected when the article was adopted. As the U.S. State
Department contends, "the territorial limitation in Article 2, far from being inconsistent
with the object and purpose of the treaty, reflects the clear and expressed intention of
those countries that negotiated the instrument."9 7
The early position of the U.S., as expressed by Mrs. Roosevelt, was that it did not want
the treaty to be applied extraterritorially because of its significant postwar commitments
in Europe and Asia, and the resulting responsibilities that would befall the U.S. in those
areas. However, as the debate over extraterritoriality heated up during the Global War on
Terror, other voices in the U.S. have rejected extraterritoriality for broader reasons. Seeing
the debate as an effort to juxtapose Human Rights Law onto International Humanitarian
Law (IHL), 98 critics argue that such peacetime human rights should not apply during war.99
Those that favor keeping human rights law separate from IHL100 contend that mixing the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 66 (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004).
97. See Waxman, supra note 82.
98. International Humanitarian Law is also referred to traditionally as the Law of Armed Conflict or the
Law of War. The different terminology describing legal rules during warfare is largely a product of
different groups seeking to use their own vocabulary. See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICT 9 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) (noting that the term "International Humanitarian Law" is
not referred to in the original Geneva Conventions); see also Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolu-
tion of the Law of War Prior to World War 11, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 176, 177 n.5 (2000) (citing a represent-
ative of the ICRC who said, "We use the term-humanitarian law-to avoid the word-war."); see also
Francoise J. Hampson, Teaching the Law ofArmed Conflict, ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV., Jul. 2008, at 4, availa-
ble at http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V5N1/Hampson.pdf (noting the "strange" use of the term IHL
after 1977 when Additional Protocol I merged the humanitarian "Law of Geneva" with the rules relat-
ing to the means and methods of combat because now "humanitarian" law includes rules that could
permit the lawful killing of civilians as collateral casualties).
99. Hansen, supra note 61, at 37 ("[H]uman rights law should apply in armed conflict only if states con-
sent to incorporating it into existing humanitarian law or agree to completely replace humanitarian
law .... However, a subtle, ominous shift towards displacing humanitarian law with human rights law
is underway, absent state consent").
100. It is interesting to note that Jean Pictet, one of the great proponents of human rights on the global
stage and an official in the International Committee of the Red Cross during and after WWII, endorsed
the traditional view that human rights law and IHL should be viewed as two separate but comple-
mentary systems. JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15 (A. W. Sijthoff
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two, absent the consent of state parties, could provoke military resistance and diminish the
credibility of human rights or, at worst, could prolong conflict by over-regulating the bat-
tlefield.101 Furthermore, replacing IHL with Human Rights Law could also deprive those
involved in war of certain protections under IHL which exceed those provided for under
Human Rights Law.102 Those that fear a merger of the two fields view efforts to externalize
the ICCPR as one foundational step in that direction, which may be another reason why
countries such as the U.S. are strongly opposing the HRC's interpretation. 103
The interpretational dispute between the U.S. and the HRC has been playing itself out on
the international stage as the U.S. has engaged itself militarily in various countries in the
Global War on Terror. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iraq, for example, called on coalition
forces in Iraq to abide by the ICCPR's guarantee of access to courts in dealing with detai-
nees, even those being held for terrorist acts. 0 4 The HRC has called on the U.S. to abide by
the ICCPR in Iraq and Afghanistan and also at its detention facilities at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba,105 but the U.S. has steadfastly refused to apply the ICCPR to its operations in any of
these countries.10 6 Yet, in rejecting the application of the ICCPR, the U.S. is not stating that
such areas are ungoverned by any authorities. On the contrary, the U.S. position is that it is
bound by the requirements and protections in the Constitution and laws of the U.S., along
with those mandated under IHL.107 Under IHL, the U.S. is permitted to "take all the meas-
ures" needed to restore public order and safety in occupied countries 08 which includes the
power to intern individuals for security reasons.'0 9 Such wartime actions would directly
conflict with the ICCPR.110 Ultimately, the schism between the U.S. interpretation of Article
2(1) and that of the HRC has important effects on the world stage, particularly with respect
to U.S. efforts in the GWOT.
One final note on the U.S. approach to the external application of the ICCPR pertains to
trans., 1975) ("[H]umanitarian law is valid only in the case of armed conflict while human rights are
essentially applicable in peacetime.").
101. Hansen, supra note 61, at 4, 7.
102. Id. at 48 (noting that a person protected under IHL could be subject to harsher punishment once
prosecuted, including hard labor or monetary fines).
103. ld. at 4, 7.
104. Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 221 (2004).
105. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States ofAmer-
ica, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Sept. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Concluding Observations].
106. Thomas J. Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent Civilian? A Call to Change the Current Means for De-
termining Status of Prisoners in the Global War on Terror, 21 FLA. I. INT'L L. 29, 41 (2009); see also Han-
sen, supra note 61, at 42-43.
107. United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights Committee 4, Oct. 10, 2007,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100845.pdf (Nov. 20, 2009) (noting the protections
afforded under IHL and U.S. law and stating that "[t]he law of war, and not the Covenant, is the appli-
cable legal framework governing these detentions").
108. The Hague Convention (IV) on Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex art. 43, Oct 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
109. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 78, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
110. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12 ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.").
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the ability of state parties to derogate their responsibilities under the ICCPR. 111 The U.S.,
after all, could have sought an Article 4 derogation for its international actions in the
GWOT simply by citing the public emergency created by September 11, 2001 and the ongo-
ing threat of transnational terrorism. However, had it done so, the U.S. would have effec-
tively been admitting that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. The U.S. is not alone in re-
fusing to make such a derogation under the ICCPR for actions outside of its territory. In
fact, no other state party to the ICCPR has claimed an Article 4 derogation for actions out-
side of their territory as it has so far only been used for internal emergencies. 112
The U.S. position on Article 2(1) of the ICCPR is based on a plain reading of the text and
the history of the Covenant's construction. It concludes that the unanimously adopted lan-
guage had the specific purpose of limiting the ICCPR to a state party's territorial bounds. 113
It further argues that the language was explicitly debated and fleshed out during the draft-
ing and adoption phases and subsequent efforts to edit the text to allow for extraterritorial
application were soundly defeated.11 4 It is a strong legal argument well grounded in the
Vienna Convention's rules of treaty interpretation and has been the basis for U.S. actions in
the GWOT.
B. HRC Position
Whereas the U.S. looks to ordinary meaning and treaty history in interpreting Article
2(1), the HRC looks more to the purposes of the ICCPR, the good faith requirement that it
imposes on state parties, and how it relates to other provisions of the Covenant. The HRC
laid out its official position on the meaning of Article 2(1) when it issued its General Com-
ment No. 31, which declared:
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Par-
ty .... Covenant rights ... must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or state-
lessness .... This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of
a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances....11s
In other words, while the U.S. reads the phrase "within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction" as requiring both conditions to be met, the HRC views the phrase disjunctively,
reading the "and" as meaning "and/or."116 Prior to issuing its General Comment, the HRC
had been taking a more piecemeal approach toward Article 2(1), recognizing its literal
meaning and finding extraterritorial application only in "exceptional circumstances" when
states acted against their own citizens living abroad. 117 However, with General Comment
No. 31, the HRC "abandoned the literal reading altogether."1 , Furthermore, its comment
also sought to define jurisdiction as being any place where a state party has "effective con-
111. Id. art. 4.
112. Dennis, supra note 80, at 88.
113. Second and Third Periodic Reports, supra note 7, at Annex I.
114. Id.
115. General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, 1 10 (emphasis added).
116. McGoldrick, supra note 90, at 48, 55.
117. Dennis, supra note 80, at 88-89.
118. ld. at 89.
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trol,"'19 which could include territories that a country occupies or leases outside of its bor-
ders. This position on Article 2(1) as promulgated by the HRC in its General Comment is
not binding,120 but it does serve as a persuasive authority, compliance with which depends
upon its acceptance by state parties.121
In taking the position that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially, the HRC can also point to
opinions of the ICJ, which tend to support its position. In 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory
opinion in the case where Israel (a State Party) had constructed a security wall in the Pal-
estinian territories.122 The ICJ held that Israel was bound to apply the ICCPR in the occu-
pied territories and that its construction of the wall was a breach of its obligations under
the ICCPR as it denied Palestinians the right to freedom of movementl 23 provided under
Article 12(1).124 In determining that the ICCPR applied extraterritorially, the ICJ referenced
an earlier advisory opinion where it held that the ICCPR was not excluded by IHL and ap-
plied during armed conflict.125 After determining that human rights law operated in con-
junction with IHL, the ICJ then determined that the language of Article 2(1) was ambiguous
enough such that it could be interpreted according to either the U.S. position or that of the
HRC.12 6 Because the ICI said such language was ambiguous, it then looked to the purpose
and construction of the treaty and determined that the drafters did not intend to "allow
States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their na-
tional territory."127
However, while the ICJ laid out its advisory opinion endorsing extraterritoriality, some
legal scholars have pointed out that the court's legal conclusion may have exceeded the
bounds of its reasoning. For example, the ICCPR provision that the ICJ said had been
breached by Israel, Article 12(1), is expressly limited to a state party's territory as it recog-
nizes freedom of movement only for "[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a state."128
As such, for the ICJ to be relying on Article 12(1) meant that it was technically viewing the
119. General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, 10.
120. Stigall, supra note 12, at 76.
121. See Mechlem, supra note 15, at 924.
122. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter The Wall Case].
123. Id. at 191-92.
124. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12(1) ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.").
125. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8)
(holding that the ICCPR "does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Cove-
nant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency" and further
noting that while the ICCPR applied in conjunction with IHL, on questions of deprivation of life which
cannot be derogated, for example, IHL is to be used to determine what constitutes arbitrary depriva-
tion).
126. See The Wall Case, 2004 1.C.J. at 179.
127. Id.
[W]hile the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the
national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Cove-
nant should be bound to comply with its provisions.
Id.
128. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
415
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 415 2011
9 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (2011)
West Bank and Gaza as Israeli territory (at least for the purposes of the ICCPR), meaning
that the Covenant was thus not being applied extraterritorially.129 Regardless, even if the
ICJ advisory opinion endorsing the HRC's interpretation did not exceed its reasoning, it ul-
timately is not binding law on state parties to the ICCPR. 3 0
Another persuasive judicial authority suggests a more limited view of extraterritoriality
compared to the ICJ. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled on the question
of extraterritoriality and held that the drafters of the ICCPR "definitively and specifically
confined" its territorial scope.131 The ECtHR went on to state: "[I]t is difficult to suggest that
the exceptional recognition by the Human Rights Committee of certain instances of extra-
territorial jurisdiction ... displaces in any way the territorial jurisdiction expressly con-
ferred by that Article...."132 So while the ICJ opinion in the case of the security wall in the
Palestinian territories lent support to the HRC position, its conclusion that the ICCPR is ex-
ternally applicable is challenged by another major international judicial body. Neither is
binding on state parties, but the presence of both provides persuasive authorities for both
sides of the debate.
In spite of the shortcomings of the HRC's opinion due to the treaty's plain meaning and
construction and the ICJ and ECtHR opinions, the HRC's reasoning behind General Com-
ment No. 31 refocuses attention on the essential purpose of the ICCPR.133 It also exposes
the potential that a strict interpretation of Article 2(1) could undermine such purpose by
carving out enclaves where parties to the ICCPR would not be bound to apply its substan-
tive provisions. 134 In General Comment No. 31, the HRC stressed the Vienna Convention's
requirement that state parties abide by the terms of their treaties in good faith135 and
noted that the essence of the ICCPR was to confer rights on individuals 36 to be protected,
not just respected, by state parties. 137 The essence of the ICCPR, then, was to focus on indi-
viduals and not states or territories. Because of this essential purpose to promote basic
rights for all human beings, failure to respect the application of such rights extraterritorial-
ly or even to protect such rights against invasion by private parties domestically would
constitute bad faith in violation of the Vienna Convention.138
Advocates of extraterritoriality also challenge claims that the U.S. originally intended
the language of Article 2(1) to apply domestically because of its postwar commitments.
While it is true that the U.S. did not want to apply the ICCPR to postwar Europe and Asia,
129. Dennis, supra note 80, at 89.
130. U.N. Charter art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case.").
131. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22.
132. Id.
133. General Comment No. 31, supra note 83.
134. See generally id.
135. Id. 3.
136. ld. 9.
137. Id. 8; see also RENt PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAw 22 (2002) ("The
obligation to 'ensure' rights does impose duties on the state which are in excess of the obligation to
respect the rights entrenched in the Covenant, lending further support to a wider application of the
instrument.").
138. Concluding Observations, supra note 105, 10.
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advocates of extraterritoriality argue that the main fear of the U.S. at that time was that it
would be responsible for human rights violations committed by others in occupied areas,
not that it feared scrutiny for its own actions.139 In highlighting the spirit of the ICCPR, the
HRC has taken a strong legal position on extraterritoriality, reminding state parties of their
obligation to support the ICCPR in good faith and seeking the moral high ground in the Ar-
ticle 2(1) debate.
Along with focusing on the purpose of the ICCPR, the HRC has also noted situations
where a literal interpretation of the Covenant would conflict with other provisions or
where it could create an absurd result. There are certain provisions granting rights, after
all, which could presumably be exercised outside of the territory of one's home state.140 Ar-
ticle 12(4), for example, permits individuals the right to re-enter their home countries,141
which, in order to be exercised (and thus subject to protection by the home state), would
require the individual to be outside the state's territory.142 Furthermore, Article 1(3) has
an express extraterritorial element, as it states: "The States Parties to the present Cove-
nant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and
Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions."143
The text of this provision clearly imposes an extraterritorial obligation on state parties
and would ultimately be mute if the ICCPR only applied domestically. The HRC's analysis of
the extraterritoriality of the ICCPR highlights important areas of textual inconsistencies
that would emerge under a strict interpretation of Article 2(1).
As it stands now, state parties to the ICCPR are not bound to adopt the extraterritorial
view of the HRC which likely deviates from the Vienna Convention's rules on treaty inter-
pretation as it does not cohere with either the plain language or the construction of the
ICCPR. Furthermore, the advisory opinion from the IC), while giving strength to the HRC's
interpretation, is ultimately limited by the reasoning that the court used in coming to its
conclusion. The ECtHR's holding further dampens support for the HRC's claims as it pro-
vides a persuasive authority to counter that of the ICJ. In many ways, the HRC faces "an
uphill struggle in seeking to implement its views on extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR."144 In spite of this, the HRC has discovered important intra-Covenant contradictions
that would emerge based on a literal interpretation of Article 2(1) and have presented
sound legal arguments that will eventually have to be addressed. In emphasizing the pur-
pose of the Covenant and the duties of state parties, the HRC is also setting a moral bench-
mark that could develop into opinio juris, one of the elements required to establish custo-
139. Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the "War on Terrorism": Reflecting on the Conversation Between Silja N.U.
Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 733 (2008).
140. McGoldrick, supra note 90, at 48.
141. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12(4) ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.").
142. See McGoldrick, supra note 90, at 48 ("The right is devoid of substance if it can only be exercised
when the individual is already within the territory of their own country.").
143. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 1(3) (emphasis added).
144. Dennis, supra note 80, at 90.
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mary international law. However, now that the HRC has pronounced its position on Article
2(1), the question remains as to how it will approach state parties like the U.S. in seeking to
promote acceptance of its opinion.
VI. Article 2(1) and the Global War on Terror
One area in which to analyze the HRC's approach is the GWOT. After all, the debate be-
tween the U.S. and the HRC over the interpretation of Article 2(1) has come into sharper
focus as the U.S. has engaged itself internationally to combat transnational terrorism. The
extraterritoriality debate has emerged as the HRC has requested reporting on U.S. activities
in areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantinamo Bay, while the U.S. has resisted such
reporting as exceeding the scope of the Covenant. Along with revealing the HRC's approach
toward promoting its position on Article 2(1), the extraterritoriality debate in the GWOT
also underscores the importance of treaty interpretation and its real world effects.
Prior to the GWOT, the U.S. submitted its first periodic report to the HRC in 1994 (just a
few years after it ratified the ICCPR), but its second and third periodic reports were not
submitted until after the start of the GWOT in 2005.145 In the combined 2005 reports, the
U.S. did not address its extraterritorial activities, in spite of a 2004 letter from the HRC re-
questing such information. 146 In the consolidated report, the U.S. noted the HRC's position
and stated that it would:
[R]espond to the Committee's concerns as fully as possible, notwithstanding the continuing
difference of view between the Committee and the United States concerning certain matters
relating to the... scope of [the ICCPR] .... [T]he United States respectfully reiterates its firmly
held legal view on the territorial scope of application of the Covenant.147
The HRC responded to the combined report by submitting a list of issues which restated
its request for information on U.S. activities beyond its borders, particularly in Afghanistan,
Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.148
In response to the HRC's list of issues, the U.S. reasserted its view of Article 2(1), but it
did address many of the HRC's questions relating to extraterritorial actions "as a courtesy"
to the committee.14 9 In addressing the HRC's request, the U.S. provided reports that it had
previously submitted to the U.N. Committee Against Torture and reemphasized that it is
145. See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 406 (2009). See also Concluding Observations, supra note 105, 1 2 (stating that the
HRC emphasized that the 2005 reports were "seven years overdue").
146. Second and Third Periodic Reports, supra note 7, at Annex 1.
147. Id. T 3.
148. U.S. Dep't of State, List of Issues To Be Taken Up in Connection With the Consideration of the Second and
Third Periodic Reports of the United States ofAmerica, Annex B, July 17, 2006.
Please indicate in detail how the State Party ensures full respect for the rights enshrined in the Co-
venant in relation to its actions to combat terrorism (a) in Afghanistan; (b) in Iraq, (c) in any other
place outside its territory, and (d) on its own territory, in particular when it holds detainees . ...
Please provide updated information on the identity, place of origin, place of deprivation of liberty
and number of persons held in Guantanamo as well as information on the release of such persons
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bound by domestic law, which prohibits all U.S. officials "from engaging in torture, at all
times, and in all places" and that the main dispute for the U.S. was only that the ICCPR did
not apply.50 In affirming the binding domestic and international authorities prohibiting
torture or cruel treatment, the U.S. did acknowledge that some individuals engaged in such
acts during GWOT operations, but that it "deplores those abuses" and has continued to in-
vestigate and prosecute the perpetrators. 15
The U.S. has strongly adhered to its position against extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR, but it has never claimed that it is not bound by any human rights obligations
abroad. Thus, the U.S. was merely telling the HRC that it was bound by laws and obligations
separate from those in the ICCPR.152 Furthermore, in making such claims, the U.S. has not
callously rejected the HRC's requests but has shown itself willing to engage the body and to
address its concerns over U.S. actions outside of its territory. This, coupled with the affir-
mation by the U.S. that international human rights obligations exist extraterritorially, sug-
gests the potential for collaboration with the HRC.
In spite of the fact that the U.S. responded to the HRC's list of issues on extraterritorial
activities, the committee persisted in requiring more in-depth reporting from the U.S. on its
actions abroad. The HRC said that it appreciated the U.S. response and "welcomes" U.S. ef-
forts to address its concerns.153 However, the Committee also said that it "regrets that only
limited information" was provided and complained that the U.S. refused to "address certain
serious allegations of violations" of the ICCPR.154 The HRC challenged the U.S. position on
extraterritoriality and its "failure" to fully consider its obligation to ensure, not just respect,
the ICCPR's substantive provisions.15s The HRC also criticized the U.S. for continuing to ad-
here to its position even after General Comment No. 31 was issued, saying that it should
recognize the external application of the ICCPR and "review its approach and interpret the
Covenant in good faith ... in light of its object and purpose." 5 6
So while the U.S. government has shown itself willing to provide limited responses in
areas that it does not deem under the authority of the ICCPR, the HRC has responded with
rather blunt language instructing the U.S. to abide by the committee's interpretation of Ar-
ticle 2(1). It is noteworthy that the HRC takes its position of promoting human rights obli-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights Committee 4, Oct 10, 2007,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100845.pdf ("The law of war, and not
the Covenant, is the applicable legal framework...."); see also Melish, supra note 145, at 437.
[11n rejecting treaty body supervision in these limited areas, the United States does not claim im-
munity from the binding rules of international human rights .... [Riather, its argument is a narrow
jurisdictional one: treaty bodies, as a technical matter, lack jurisdiction over the United States in
such areas ....
Id.
153. Concluding Observations, supra note 105, S. The HRC offered praise for the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion requiring common article three of the Geneva Convention to be applied to detainees. Id.; see gen-
erally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562-63 (2006).
154. Concluding Observations, supra note 105, T7 2-4.
155. Id. T 10.
156. Id.
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gations seriously, but in approaching the dispute in this way and with such language the
HRC has the potential to alienate an important state party to the ICCPR, which may be open
to a more engaging approach. Furthermore, by continuing to press the issue as it has, the
HRC is allowing the U.S. to continue to lodge its opposition to extraterritorial application of
the ICCPR. This provides it with a persistent objector status, which would mean that if any
customary norm recognizing extraterritoriality was established, the U.S. would not be
bound. Rather than providing opportunities for the U.S. to object, the HRC should instead
encourage continued cooperation and courtesy reports as this may help to establish state
practice by which the U.S. would be bound.
The long-standing hesitancy of the U.S. to submit itself to such extraterritorial obliga-
tions, after all, is likely a reflection of its "self-awareness as the world's sole remaining mili-
tary superpower" having greater international responsibilities and therefore requiring
greater flexibility to address them.157 The U.S. approach of being actively engaged with the
ICCPR, while cordoning off certain areas based on a valid reading of the treaty, should not
be condemned but rather recognized as a "mediation tactic" or a "compromise strategy to
conserve U.S. human rights engagement" 5 8 as the U.S. seeks to promote the treaty but also
to preserve its ability to act internationally.15 9
Because of the unique position of the U.S., its reliance on a strong argument interpreting
Article 2(1) and its important role in international human rights, the HRC should seek
more to persuade rather than to condemn. The willingness of the U.S. to engage and even
provide courtesy reports on extraterritorial actions should not be easily dismissed, but ra-
ther should be encouraged, as should a continuing dialogue. The HRC is relying, after all, on
an interpretation that goes against plain meaning and treaty construction and ultimately is
not controlling on state parties. In spite of these limitations, its argument is reasoned and
raises important areas where a plain reading of Article 2(1) would lead to potentially ab-
surd results.
Utilizing a more diplomatic approach, the HRC could give greater effect to its extraterri-
torial argument seeking to persuade state parties and by fostering an international norm
recognizing the application of ICCPR rights to all individuals regardless of where they are
or what country is in effective control of their territory. 60 Reaching out to non-
governmental organizations, utilizing international media, and staying engaged with im-
portant government leaders is one way to promote such a norm. Furthermore, if the U.S.
continues to provide courtesy reports to the HRC regarding extraterritorial activities, it
could establish a "subsequent practice" for purposes of the Vienna Convention' 6 ' which
157. Melish, supra note 145, at 436-37.
158. Id. at 436.
159. See id. (noting the domestic pressures in the U.S. to completely disengage with international bodies
like the ICJ or ICC because of the possibility that they could exercise jurisdiction over U.S. military in-
terventions).
160. See generally Stigall, supra note 12, at 95-96 (arguing that the extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR is in the process of becoming customary international law which would become binding on all
state parties) ("[O]nce this nascent practice blooms into customary international law, there will be no
distance one may travel to elude it.")).
161. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(3).
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could establish acceptance of the HRC's interpretation. However, if the HRC were to take
the contrary path and engage in the shaming of important state parties like the U.S., whose
main contention is jurisdictional rather than substantive, it could not only make such coun-
tries less willing to engage in a debate over the scope of the Covenant, but it could also di-
minish the overall credibility of the HRC as well.
VII. Conclusion
The ICCPR is one of the most important human rights treaties to have emerged in histo-
ry, mainly because it was the first time that state parties from all parts of the world were
bound to ensure individual human rights. The primary dispute that has emerged, however,
has been one of jurisdiction. The HRC claims that Article 2(1) gives the covenant extraterri-
torial effect whereas the U.S. claims that the provision limits the ICCPR only to the domes-
tic realm of state parties. Based on the plain language of the treaty and the history of its
construction, the U.S. has a strong argument showing that the drafters of the covenant in-
tended for it to be limited to the domestic boundaries of a state. However, while the HRC
has gone beyond the plain language of the treaty language, it has offered persuasive argu-
ments for an extraterritorial application based on the overall purpose of the treaty and on
instances where a plain reading would conflict with other provisions. This dispute has
played itself out internationally, particularly in the GWOT, as the U.S. has objected to the
HRC's requests for reporting on activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantinamo, among
other locations. However, after some prodding by the HRC, the U.S. has provided limited
courtesy reports on its actions abroad while reaffirming its interpretation of Article 2(1).
Right now the HRC is at a crossroads on the issue of extraterritorial application of
ICCPR. Its initial responses to the U.S. have been highly critical and dismissive of any con-
trary interpretations of Article 2(1). If it continues down this path it may very likely jeo-
pardize any future collaboration between itself and the U.S. or other state parties that
agree with the U.S. position on the ICCPR's jurisdiction. On the other hand, it could take a
more diplomatic and engaging approach to the U.S. by recognizing its efforts to compro-
mise, which could ultimately establish a "subsequent practice" that would enhance the
HRC's position. Also, by resorting to reasoned analysis and persuasive engagement, the
HRC can also promote a norm of universal application of the ICCPR to any individual re-
gardless of what country has effective control over the territory where they reside. Such
norms would become binding through customary international law, thus muting the dis-
pute over the interpretation of Article 2(1) so long as the HRC does not continue to give the
U.S. opportunities to establish itself as a persistent objector. The HRC, and human rights for
that matter, would be better suited by taking the latter approach as it would foster greater
cooperation by state parties and refocus the discussion away from questions of jurisdiction
and back where they should always be-on the promotion of human rights.
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